Showing 3 results for Zandi
Mostafa Ekhtiari, Mostafa Zandieh, Akbar Alem-Tabriz, Masood Rabieh,
Volume 29, Issue 1 (IJIEPR 2018)
Abstract
Supplier selection is one of the influential decisions for effectiveness of purchasing and manufacturing policies under competitive conditions of the market. Regarding the fact that decision makers (DMs) consider conflicting criteria for selecting suppliers, multiple-criteria programming is a promising approach to solve the problem. This paper develops a nadir compromise programming (NCP) model for decision-making under uncertainty on the selection of suppliers within the framework of binary programming. Depending on the condition of uncertainty, three statuses are taken into consideration and a solution approach is proposed for each status. A pure deterministic NCP model is presented for solving the problem in white condition (certainty of data) and a solution approach resulted from combination of NCP and stochastic programming is introduced to solve the model in black (uncertainty of data) situation. The paper also proposes a NCP model under certainty and uncertainty for solving problem under grey (a combination of certainty and uncertainty of data) conditions. The proposed approaches are illustrated for a real problem in steel industry with multiple objectives. Also, a simulation approach has been designed in order to examine the results obtained and also verifies capabilities of the proposed model.
Shahla Zandi, Reza Samizadeh, Maryam Esmaeili,
Volume 33, Issue 4 (IJIEPR 2022)
Abstract
A coalition loyalty program (CLP) is a business strategy employed by for-profit companies to increase or retain their customers. One of the operational challenges of these programs is how to choose the mechanism of coordination between business partners. This paper examines the role of revenue sharing contracts in the loyalty points supply chain of a CLP with stochastic advertising-dependent demand where the program operator (called the host) sells loyalty points to the partners of the program. The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of this coordination mechanism on the decisions and profits of the members of the chain using the Stackelberg game method and determine whether the presence of revenue sharing contracts benefits the chain members when the advertising is done by the host and when the advertising cost is shared between the host and its partners. The results show that when the host gives bonus points to end customers (advertising), revenue sharing contracts become a powerful incentive for the profitability of the host and its partners. The findings provide new insights into the management of CLPs, which can benefit business decision-makers.
Shahla Zandi, Reza Samizadeh, Maryam Esmaeili,
Volume 34, Issue 3 (IJIEPR 2023)
Abstract
A coalition loyalty program (CLP) is a business strategy adopted by companies to increase and retain their customers. An operational challenge in this regard is to determine the coordination mechanism with business partners. This study investigated the role of revenue-sharing contracts (RSCs) considering customer satisfaction in coalition loyalty reward supply chain planning. A two-stage stochastic programming approach was considered for the solution considering the demand uncertainty. We aimed to investigate the impact of RSCs on the decision-making and profitability of the host firm of this supply chain taking into account the maximization of the profit coming from the CLP compared to the more common wholesale price contract (WPC). After the model was solved, computational experiments were performed to evaluate and compare the effects of RSCs and WPCs on the performance of the loyalty program (LP). The results revealed that RSC is an effective incentive to increase the host’s profit and reduce its cost. These findings add new insights to the management literature, which can be used by business decision makers.
