Showing 6 results for Advertising
Parinaz Esmaeili, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, Seyed Reza Hejazi,
Volume 27, Issue 1 (3-2016)
Abstract
Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known approaches in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are exploited to study the effects of pricing and advertising decisions on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal decisions in each case for the supplier, the manufacturer and the retailer. Also, we compare the outcomes decisions among the mentioned games. The results show that, the Cooperative and the Nash games have the highest and lowest advertising expenditure, respectively. The price level in the Nash game is more than the Stackelberg game for all three levels, and the retailer price in the Stackelberg and Cooperative games are equal. The system has the highest profit in the Cooperative game. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.
Parinaz Esmaeili, Seyed Reza Hejazi, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 28, Issue 2 (6-2017)
Abstract
This paper considers the advertising, pricing, and service decisions simultaneously to coordinate the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by advertising, pricing and service decisions. In this paper, three well-known approaches to the game theory, including the Nash, the Stackelberg-retailer, and the cooperative game are exploited to study the effects of these policies on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal strategies in each case for the manufacturer and the retailer. Then, we will compare the outcomes of each strategy thus developed. The results show that, compared with the Nash game, the Stackelberg-retailer game yields higher profits for the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole system. The cooperative game yields the highest profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.
Ali Borumand, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 30, Issue 3 (9-2019)
Abstract
In this paper, greening, pricing, and advertising policies in a supply chain will be examined with government intervention. The supply chain has two members. First, a manufacturer seeking to determine the wholesale price and the greening level and second, a retailer that has to determine the advertising cost and the retail price. The government is trying to encourage the manufacturer to green the production using subsidies. Using the game theory, at first, the demand function and the profit functions of both members are introduced, then in a dynamic game, their Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated. Sensitivity and parameter analysis are made to more illustration of the problem. We found the supply chain profit function behavior and results show that if the sensitivity of demand-price is less than a specific value, the manufacturer will not participate in greening policies.
Saeed Dehnavi, Ahmad Sadegheih,
Volume 31, Issue 1 (3-2020)
Abstract
In this paper, an integrated mathematical model of the dynamic cell formation and production planning, considering the pricing and advertising decision is proposed. This paper puts emphasis on the effect of demand aspects (e.g., pricing and advertising decisions) along with the supply aspects (e.g., reconfiguration, inventory, backorder and outsourcing decisions) in developed model. Due to imprecise and fuzzy nature of input data such as unit costs, capacities and processing times in practice, a fuzzy multi-objective programming model is proposed to determine the optimal demand and supply variables simultaneously. For this purpose, a fuzzy goal programming method is used to solve the equivalent defuzzified multi-objective model. The objective functions are to maximize the total profit for firm and maximize the utilization rate of machine capacity. The proposed model and solution method is verified by a numerical example.
Shahla Zandi, Reza Samizadeh, Maryam Esmaeili,
Volume 33, Issue 4 (12-2022)
Abstract
A coalition loyalty program (CLP) is a business strategy employed by for-profit companies to increase or retain their customers. One of the operational challenges of these programs is how to choose the mechanism of coordination between business partners. This paper examines the role of revenue sharing contracts in the loyalty points supply chain of a CLP with stochastic advertising-dependent demand where the program operator (called the host) sells loyalty points to the partners of the program. The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of this coordination mechanism on the decisions and profits of the members of the chain using the Stackelberg game method and determine whether the presence of revenue sharing contracts benefits the chain members when the advertising is done by the host and when the advertising cost is shared between the host and its partners. The results show that when the host gives bonus points to end customers (advertising), revenue sharing contracts become a powerful incentive for the profitability of the host and its partners. The findings provide new insights into the management of CLPs, which can benefit business decision-makers.
Seyed Mahdi Aghazadeh, Hamid Farvaresh,
Volume 34, Issue 4 (12-2023)
Abstract
The growing online marketplace has opened a plethora of opportunities for businesses across various industries. Manufacturers, seeking to bypass intermediaries and directly reach end-users, have been increasingly adopting online sales channels in addition to their traditional retail sales. A key challenge, however, lies in determining optimal pricing strategies and advertising investments for both manufacturers and retailers while considering various constraints. This study contemplates a two-echelon supply chain model involving one manufacturer and two retailers. The manufacturer sells its product both through retailers (offline channel) and directly to consumers via an online channel. The model features both global and local advertising. The influence of global advertising is realized through distinct advertising channels, each with a unique impact on demand. To further motivate retailers, the manufacturer contributes to the cost of local advertising. In response to these challenges, this research formulates a bi-level model and employs the concept of Variational Inequalities to solve it. The model also contends with production capacity and budget constraints, leading to a Generalized Nash-Stackelberg game. The validity of the model and the efficacy of the solution method are assessed through numerical experiments performed. Finally, a set of valuable managerial insights are provided.
